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Several salient moral issues surface vis-a-vis the AIDS problem. The 
intent of this article is to stimulate discussion by posing questions of a 
significant nature for hospitals, their personnel and constituencies. An 
attempt will be made to answer these questions within a (hopefully) 
coherent and consistent ethical framework, in order that a "scaffolding" 
might be developed for further debate and refinement. 
Before doing so, a few remarks must be made concerning the distinction 
between legality and morality. Law is basically an abstraction from the 
morality of a given group of people and , therefore, laws necessarily have 
some moral underpinning and rationale. Nonetheless, there are differences 
between the two which are pertinent to the discussion. 
Most laws deal with what is obligatory, particularly with obligations 
which are coupled with punishment and / or reparations of some sort. 
Although ethical theory inquires into the reasonable grounds for the 
justification of these legal obligations, it also deals with what is 
supererogatory, i.e., with actions which are praiseworthy to do, but not 
blameworthy not to do. 1 This distinction is particularly relevant to an 
ostensibly pluralistic and "secular" society. Legal obligations are binding 
on all citizens, regardless of specific religious and moral beliefs. Although 
an individual, in good conscience, may choose to disobey a positive law, 
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the state may still exert its right to compel obedience and to levy 
punishment. The realm of the supererogatory, however, is often viewed as 
the province of individual, voluntary religious perspectives. We like to 
keep the heroic and saintly free from compulsion and punishment, even if 
we admire it exceedingly. 
It is also not too great a caricature of the law, ancient and modern, to say 
that it deals primarily with negatives, with "Thou shalt nots", while it is 
often the case that religious morality, for example, is full of positive 
commandments - to "go the second mile", etc. 
In our lived moral experience, it is often hard to disentangle these 
distinctions , especially since our culture rests historically on many of the 
value assumptions of"ludeo-Christianity." The common moral assump-
tions of the "everyday person" are willy-nilly the inheritance of this 
tradition, and this fact ' contributes to much of the confusion a"nd 
vehemence of contemporary moral debates. This is particularly 
problematic for religious hospitals, which must respect secular laws and 
"rights" while at the same time remaining faithful to their heritages. It is 
tempting to short-cut moral debate by referring exclusively to the 
requirements of the law - to merely prudential considerations often 
phrased in terms like "What will happen to mel us ifI l we do l don't do such 
and such?" It is, however, possible that courts will increasingly look to 
medical experts for advice on matters as socially explosive and as 
empirically confusing as AIDS, thus putting medical institutions in the 
role of providing reasonable justification for such policies, whether or not 
they want to be in such a role. 
It may be helpful to discuss AIDS from the standpoint of responsibility 
and role. Such a framework may be able to clarify some problems 
surrounding the distinction previously made between obligations binding 
on all citizens of a pluralistic society and those moral values which free 
citizens might voluntarily choose for themselves. The former may be called 
"natural law I social contract" ethics, and the latter religious ethics. 2 
This article will explore three role-specific areas of responsibility: I) the 
responsibility of citizens, government and the afflicted; 2) the 
responsibility of hospital administration, specifically, of a religious 
hospital and 3) the responsibility of the physician I researcher and of other 
hospital personnel. There are obviously many overlaps here. This very fact 
reinforces the agony of the dilemma. Much of the "dilemma" aspect of the 
current AIDS debate comes from tensions inherent in these roles. Much of 
morality is, in fact, role-specific, and universal only with regard to the 
universal aspects of that role. 3 Such role-conditioned responsibilities may 
differ and even clash with each other. But looking at the problem through 
the "lens" of responsibility and role may help to shed some light on, and 
bring some order to, a very urgent and perplexing problem. 
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Responsibility of Citizens, Government and the Afflicted 
It is somewhat odd, no doubt, to speak of the responsibility of the 
afflicted in a hospital context. Yet this particular area is hotly debated 
among the public, and the attitude of the public will put considerable 
pressure on politics and law. It may not prove to be irrelevant to those in 
positions of power within medical institutions, either. 
I t is sometimes assumed, by people acting solely out of an understanding 
of the secular, social contract view, that citizens are basically bearers of 
negative rights vis-a-vis the state. That is to say, the state "owes" them 
freedom from undue interference of various kinds. There is considerable 
truth to this position. The eminent philosopher, John Rawls, elucidates 
one of the principles of a liberal social order, based on social contract 
theory, as "maximum liberty compatible with like liberty for all."4 The key 
problem, of course, is spelling out what is meant by "compatible," 
especially when we are dealing with AIDS . Though we can make a strong 
case that the presumption of the social contract is for individual freedom 
(i.e., the state bears the burden of proof in reducing freedom), this freedom 
cannot, obviously, be absolute. The state reserves the right to conscript 
persons for military service in the event of grave threat to the state, e.g., in 
wartime. The state will declare certain of an individual's rights to freedom 
forfeit should they prove to be incompatible with others, e.g., when that 
individual harms people. Certainly the state has the right, and has exerted 
the right historically, to abrogate personal rights in the event of massive 
social harm, such as an epidemic, through such measures as involuntary 
quarantine and isolation. 5 
AIDS may come to present a severe enough threat to public well-being 
to warrant measures such as mandatory testing and perhaps quarantine / 
isolation as well. It is important, however, that certain moral safeguards be 
met should such a situation arise. 
The general moral obligation to "do no harm", taken, in the case of 
AIDS, in the even stronger sense of "do not kill", can, by even the strongest 
variety of legal positivism and secularism, be considered a fundamental 
negative of the natural law. In the thought of H. L. A. Hart, a late, great 
legal scholar, it can be considered afunctional requisite for all societies, 
irrespective of religious or quasi-religious orientation. 6 
The transmission of the AIDS virus is obviously, on the basis of 
consequences. an act of harm, whether or not it is willfully intended. As 
such it can be considered grounds for the abrogation of specific rights to 
freedom, which may include such measures as quarantine / isolation and 
mandatory testing. 
Testing 
Having AIDS and knowing it, and refraining from telling an "innocent" 
party beforehand can easily be construed as an act of murder, (short of 
psychotic depression, or the sort of heroic, voluntary experimentation 
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which some medical researchers might perform upon themselves in order 
to try to develop a cure). 
Accordingly, from the standpoint of the social consequences of 
transmitting the virus, a case can be made for mandatory testing. 
Ignorance normally exonerates. Willful ignorance, as Aristotle argued, 
does not. One cannot morally refuse to know whether or not one carries 
the disease when transmission can result in serious injury or death. 
The last point brings us to a volatile issue in the public debate, one which 
is fraught with paranoia and misunderstanding. It is an unfortunate fact 
that, in this country at least, "high-risk" populations for AIDS are also 
outcast populations socially. The fact that the disease has now spread 
beyond homosexual and drug-abuse populations has done little to stop 
paranoia on the part of these groups, and has probably exacerbated the 
problems of their outcast status. Yet the paronoia of these specific 
populations, however justifiable, must not be allowed to cloud the issue of 
what measures are necessary to stop a possible epidemic. There is no right 
to spread lethal disease. There are, however, sound grounds for arguing 
that "high risk" groups ought not to be singled out for special measures, 
such as mandatory testing. 
Internationally, the disease is not at all confined to these populations, 
nor can it be proven to have originated in them. Evidence suggests that it is 
no longer confined to these groups in this country.7 Since it is not 
exclusively a disease "belonging" to these groups, there is no ground for 
isolating these groups for testing. At what point the demographics of the 
disease will force the issue of universal, mandatory testing is difficult to 
say,8 but its justifiability, in theory, is not. 
I t is, of course, the case that testing is itself fraught with difficulties, such 
as the long incubation period for the disease and questions concerning the 
very reliability of the present tests, including the problems associated with 
false positives. These complex empirical problems make it very difficult to 
determine precisely at what point the presumption for individual freedom 
might be justly abrogated. Yet these difficulties, however great, ought not 
to be taken as arguments against universal, mandatory testing. It could be 
argued, for example, that the threat of such testing would merely drive 
people, particularly those in high-risk categories, "underground." This 
could no doubt happen. But it is also highly probable that universal testing 
would lessen the reticence of "high risk" groups to be tested, since it could 
not be considered discriminatory. 
The Issue of Quarantine/Isolation 
What ought to happen if one is found to test positive? While AIDS is, of 
course, an illness, its primary means of transmission, at this point, appears 
to be sexual. This renders the issue of quarantine( isolation extremely 
problematic. It is rendered more problematic by empirical confusion, even 
among experts, concerning the possibilities of the disease's transmission 
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by other "involuntary" means - e.g., by salvia, mosquitoes, etc., and not 
simply by transfusion or by other contact with infected blood or semen. 9 
Even if we were to focus only on transmission by sexual means, 
however, the issues of quarantine and / or isolation would not thereby be 
done away with. Even if the infected person was an "innocent" recipient of 
the disease, e.g., a hemophiliac, we would still be justified in considering 
the objective danger of spreading the disease more important than the loss 
of freedom which might ensue, even to an "innocently" infected person. 
Can we depend upon voluntary abstinence or upon voluntary use of 
condoms? May we presume that a carrier is honest in telling sex partners 
he/ she is infected? Here we have a "human nature" assumption of the first 
magnitude at work. Even those claiming fidelity for five years or 10ngeriO 
have been known to fool or to be fooled , have they not? Everyone today is 
at some risk. 
For the above reasons, the claim of some infected sufferers to have a 
handicapping condition analogous, say, to being confined to a wheelchair 
for non-contagious reasons, is dubious in the extreme. I I And, if there 
should prove to be other means of transmission than the (primarily) 
sexual, the argument for isolation will become very compelling. In the light 
of "human nature" and empirical uncertainty, prophylactic measures can 
be defended, including segregation in hospitals. 
Financial Responsibilities 
Insurance executives have claimed that the life-style of persons presently 
in high-risk groups for AIDS, produces risks analogous to those produced 
by cigarette smoking: if claims can be adjusted or refunded for this, why 
not for AIDS?12 This problem raises questions not only of a financial, but 
also of a deep philosophical nature. They are not irrelevant questions for 
hospitals, of course. 
Insurance industries agree that adults are responsible for their behavior, 
especially for their sexual behavior! They also tend to argue that certain 
forms of sexual activity constitute high risk behavior; hence they feel 
justified in selectively screening these applicants for insurance. The 
argument , on the face of it, is a strong one. It is difficult to ascertain what 
arguments justify compelling private companies to pay for the illnesses of 
persons who persist in high risk behavior. 
The case for government intervention is a more subtle one. One could 
argue that government has a responsibility to pay for accidental diseases 
and events befalling innocent persons, but the sexual and drug-abuse 
modes of transmission for this disease may cause it to fall into a 
"borderline" area.13 It is also the case that the "cost-benefits" analysis 
which large governmental agencies tend to follow will often favor 
prevention over cure or treatment. That is to say, in the case of AIDS tax 
dollars would most probably be maximized by screening (testing) and by 
instituting various methods of stopping the transmission of the disease 
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than by treating those already affected. Such is the type of reasoning that 
causes some to question the enormous expense of AZT in the treatment of 
apparently hopeless cases. 
At any rate, failure of private or governmental agencies to pay for these 
unfortunate sufferers poses urgent dilemmas for hospitals, particularly for 
those claiming allegiance to religious values. The care for persons 
irrespective of causes and costs is often a religious ideal. But it is also 
obvious that hospitals might not be able to carry this burden alone. 
Hospitals may have to pool resources in order to deal with the problem of 
AIDS, while at the same time lobbying government for greater financial 
support. Such pooling may include, for example, the building of 
sanitariums in key geographical areas. 
Responsibilities of Administrators of a Christian Hospital 
The public debate concerning the personal responsibility of the sufferer 
may inevitably prove to be a difficult, but necessary, moral issue for a 
hospital to discuss. Obviously, hospitals provide care to the sick, 
regardless of etiological or causal questions concerning the illness or 
injury. This is even more the case for an institution grounded in religious 
values, such as grace, forgiveness, unconditional love, etc. (It will not be 
argued here why these theological ideas may coincide with determinism 
and thus weaken arguments concerning the culpability of sufferers). 
Thus, with regard to a religious hospital's moral obligation to the 
indigent in general, and to some AIDS sufferers in particular, a religious 
institution may not recognize the obligation/ supererogation distinction 
that a more secular hospital might prefer. The case for the outcast, 
regardless of cause, is, in light of the Bible a moral obligation, and not a 
non-required but nice thing to do. 
Thus, prima jacie, a religious institution's unconditional obligation to 
the sick could be seen to run counter to some aforementioned views 
concerning patient/ sufferer responsibility. And, in the extreme, an 
attitude of unconditional caring such as this could financially destabilize, 
and ultimately destroy a hospital, particularly if these measures are not 
concerted with or shared with other hospitals and caring institutions. 
The problem is that institutions have responsibilities to their 
constituents to survive - certainly not at any moral cost, but perhaps at a 
great deal of cost. In addition to the obvious burden of direct financial 
costs raised by AIDS, there are public relations costs as well. Lawyers for 
fired AIDS employees have argued that hospitals are only interested in 
what the public will think.14 This argument has some truth to it, but is 
reductionistic in the extreme. It is not unusual or immoral for an 
institution to delicately balance its public relations with the issues of 
employee or patient "rights." While it is true that the public suffers from a 
great deal of misinformation concerning AIDS, especially concerning its 
transmission, there is even conflicting information among experts. And 
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although truth and education are obviously parts of what any hospital 
stands for, the hospital's position, in light of empirical uncertainty, is very 
problematic. 
If there is absolutely no danger of ("accidental") transmission of AIDS, 
then there is real discrimination if infected employees are fired or 
reassigned. Few experts, however, would argue that there is absolutely no 
danger of such transmission. 15 Given this slight empirical possibility of 
harm, intentional or not, it follows from what has been argued previously, 
that mandatory testing of employees and patients is warranted, and 
perhaps segregation and / or dismissal as well. An extreme prophylaxis, 
until some coherence can be brought to the empirical dimensions of this 
problem, is good for the society and "good PR", both in a moral and in an 
effective sense. 
An institution, by its very nature, must be utilitarian in character. I.t 
must coolly weight the facts, including financial costs and public relations, 
in the balances with issues such as the "rights" of patients and employees. If 
the hospital were empirically convinced that an employee or patient 
infected with the virus posed no threat to the health of others, it would still 
have to weigh this truth in the balances with the costs of public reaction. 
This is utilitarianism's "Achilles heel" - that it justifies itself in hanging an 
innocent man in order to stop a riot. 16 
The situation becomes ever murkier with threats of expensive lawsuits 
by "handicapped" employees. That is why a hospital has a responsibility to 
educate the public concerning the logical difference between a handicap 
and a CONTAGIOUS disease. 
One final comment for hospital management. It is not beyond 
possibility that there might come a time when care for AIDS patients 
becomes so financially prohibitive that the resultant competition for 
scarce resources may make the issue of personal responsibility a selection 
factor for an otherwise unconditionally caring institution. Those familiar 
with the "lifeboat ethics" game will remember that culpability is often 
selected as a criterion for allocation or non-allocation of scarce resources. 
I t is therefore not inconceivable that, should this disease become a massive 
epidemic, a philosophical conflict between the ideas of personal 
responsibility and unconditional caring will be forced. It will not be pretty 
or easy. And though it is too "abstract" for many, its "resolution" will be a 
logical necessity before any clarity can be given to the question of what 
"ought" to be done. 
Employee Obligations: Doctor-Patient Confidentiality 
The literature on AIDS shows a growing emphasis on confidentiality in 
the doctor-patient relationship. Voluntary tests and counseling are 
advocated by almost all relevant institutions but the insurance agencies. 17 
There is a great problem here. Historically, the doctor-patient 
relationship has been built, of course, on trust and confidentiality. These 
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values, and their underlying abstract norms of truth-telling and promise-
keeping have often been used to counter utilitarian claims to use the one or 
the few for the sake of the many. In most cases, the idea that the physician 
is directly or primarily responsible to the patient, and only secondarily 
responsible to the society or to scientific advancement, is a laudable one, 
and one with great presence in historic codes of medical ethics. 18 It is also 
the case that a disclosure of a patient's disease status often brings social 
stigmatization and loss of financial security. For these reasons, ethicists 
have written to the effect that the labeling of the sick is justified only to the 
extent that such labels conduce to access, by the sufferer, to special 
resources and privileges. 19 
These historic principles are good presumptions but do not apply 
completely to AIDS. AIDS is an illness involving triadic relationships: the 
physician, patient and others are involved (e.g., sex partners and, perhaps 
various financial institutions). There has been a history of government and 
hospital-supported contact-tracing with regard to other venereal diseases, 
and AIDS ought not to be an exception.20 
Consequentialist moral arguments (i.e., those arguments of a non-
religious nature)21 usually conclude that the important norms of promise-
keeping and truth-telling, which underlie not only medical relationships, 
but the very ability of societies to function at all are, while stringent, not 
nearly as stringent as the norm to avoid the injury / death of other persons. 
Only a deontological fanatic22 could think that confidentiality is more 
important, in conflict-of-rule situations, than avoiding harm. 
The fact that confidentiality has been abrogated in other cases regarding 
sexually transmitted diseases attests to the tremendous political lobbying 
power of groups presently afflicted, and not to the moral legitimacy of 
such an attitude vis-a-vis the social contact. 
Disclosure by Employees? 
According to one professor of health law, the obligation of employees to 
disclose disease-carrying status would be binding if there were possible 
harm of transmission. 23 Here, truth-telling would be in tandem with 
non-maleficence (not harming). A patient's right to informed consent of 
this kind is only valid where the possibility of harm is established. 
Empirically, transmission through medical care and surgery is a very 
difficult problem. It would be better to err on the side of disclosure than to 
run the risk, however small, not only of transmission of infection, but also 
of what one lawyer projects as litigated damages in the tens of millions of 
dollars, should a patient receive the disease from a hospital employee. 24 
Mandatory testing of employees and patients would, of course, disclose 
an employee's or a patient's illness to at least certain members of hospital 
management. Management would, in the case of the infected employee or 
patient, have to decide among various options: to do nothing and hope for 
the best; to dismiss or isolate the employee or patient; or perhaps to allow 
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the patient or employee to continue their relationships, provided that the 
infected party disclose his or her status to the other, and that the non-
infected party consent. 
Again, management is forced into the position of having to prioritize 
various harms. It should keep in mind, however, that the presumption "do 
no harm" is most stringent in the form of causing death. The harms of 
stigma and joblessness, while obviously grievous, are not as important as 
not killing. (See addendum). 
The recent decision of the Center for Disease Control to oppose 
mandatory tests, while at the same time endorsing contact tracing, shows 
the paradoxes resultant from failing to weight the norms correctly.25 
A Problem for the Medical Researcher 
One other position of the CDC seems morally indefensible on the basis 
of the admittedly sketchy ethical framework proposed. This is the problem 
of the anonymous testing of blood samples (as opposed to confidential 
testing). A researcher involved in the study contended that it would have 
been unethical to test "identified" blood samples without permission. Here 
informed consent is said to outweigh what one researcher called "the only 
downside" to the experiment - that patients would not know they were 
positive. 26 
This type of non-consequential reasoning, which implies that 
anonymity is more important than the spread of death, is certainly difficult 
to defend. Consequentialists argue that we are responsible for sins of 
omission as well as for sins of commission. 27 In this respect the researchers 
could be found morally guilty of complicity in homicide. 
It is thus an interesting question (one occurring often with regard to 
experimental designs using placebos) whether or not the above-mentioned 
statistical experiment amounts to withholding known effective treatment 
(if drugs like AZT can be considered at all efficacious).28 
Ought an Employee be Forced to Work with AIDS Sufferers? 
Self-sacrifice is, from a religious perspective, of the nighest moral order. 
"Secular" societies also give lip-service to it. Only in extreme situations can 
it be considered obligatory to sacrifice oneself for another. It must, 
according to social contact theory, be supererogatory and therefore purely 
voluntary. The only exception is, possibly, wartime, when the perceived 
threat to the body politic is so grave that the flower of the nation's youth 
can be involuntarily conscripted and can possibly face death as a result. It 
is hard to see a physician'S role vis-a-vis an AIDS patient as at all 
analogous to a wartime situation. Even a massive epidemic would not be 
analogous, since, at present, AIDS is a thoroughly lethal disease. Noone 
can require self-sacrifice for hopeless cases. 
Heroes and saints are admired by secularists and religionists alike for 
running self-sacrificial risks. But no one can make this mandatory or 
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obligatory. There would be no social contract if individuals were forced to 
take these risks. The self-preservation of the individual is the reason for the 
contract in the first place. 
Since the Hippocratic oath, physicians have been seen to verge on 
making the supererogatory the obligatory.29 But this must be a religious 
(or quasi-religious) decision of the physician, one made without coercion. 
One could argue that the highest religious value is self-sacrifice, but not 
even a religious hospital could turn this into an obligation.30 Still, it may be 
the case that a society that does not try to instill the moral values of risk 
and self-sacrifice for the sake of others will not, in the end, be able even to 
function at all. 
Summary 
AIDS may come to constitute a national emergency, in terms of lives 
and dollars, of such magnitude that the normal presumptions for maximal 
individual freedom can justly be abrogated . In light of both important 
empirical certainties and uncertainties concerning its transmission, 
universal mandatory tests and even subsequent isolation can be defended 
as measures morally undertaken both by the state and by other relevant 
institutions, such as hospitals. 
Though issues of individual responsibility and culpability may 
necessarily arise, particularly from a "secular" social-contract perspective, 
a religious hospital, and individual religious employees bear a terrible 
responsibility for these unfortunates. What happens to them, and who will 
pay for them, is a problem that the religious conscience cannot shirk as 
easily as the secular. 
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